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Chapter I. Introduction.
The Purpose of Study
For all corporations which may be considering doing 
business with a host country, especially with a developing 
country, a deep understanding of its economic and political 
system, that government's goals, priorities and trade 
policies, and the business cultural environment of the host 
country is very important.
The major purpose of this paper is to offer to American 
companies which would like to enter into and trade with China 
a better understanding of the cultural differences and the 
current economic condition between the U.S. and China. These 
include the background of China's "open-door" and "economic 
reform" policies, achievement, and the problems encountered 
in its recent economic development. This purpose can best be 
accomplished by reviewing the trade relationship between the 
U.S. and China in recent years, and in examining China's 
foreign trade policy, priorities, and particularly, the 
obstacles which some American companies in China have already 
experienced. The author intends to offer useful references 
to American companies to assist them in their decision-making 
process of potentially entering into and trading with China. 
Once American firms have decided to enter into trade with
1
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China the process of negotiating with the Chinese, will most 
likely be the first and the most difficult step for them. 
Through identifying some particular cultural traits in the 
Chinese culture, which might reflect upon and influence any 
negotiation with the Chinese, this paper will also discuss 
some necessary adjustments which may prove helpful to 
American companies in negotiating tactics so as to enable 
them to gain the permission required to enter into trade with 
China and to ultimately reach contractual agreement.
There is a saying in The Art of War, an ancient Chinese 
military book which was written by Sun Tzu 2300 years ago, 
"Knowing one's own position and that of enemy guarantees 
victory in every battle."
Since the launching of its four modernization drives at 
the end of 1978, China has abandoned its self-reliance policy 
which had been observed during Mao's era and made a 180- 
degree turn toward becoming an important member of the 
international trading community. Since 1979, the value of 
China's trade with the rest of the world has grown 
substantially. By 1985, according to the statistics of IMF 
from a report dated June 1986, China's imports exceeded $42.5 
billion while exports exceeded $27.3 billion,^ almost six 
times the 1975 figure, making China one of the world's 
biggest developing-country markets. However, since the
^G.A. Thoma, "The Structure of Trade Between the 
U.S. and China," Business Economics (October 1986): 32.
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policy of opening trade to the outside world, which was 
announced in 1978, China has become a major purchaser of 
grain, cotton, chemical fertilizers, metals, machinery, and 
equipment. With the opening of this new and huge 1.05- 
billion population market, and its continuous "Five-Year 
Plans, ” which have been set up by the Chinese government, 
many new business prospects have been opened up to the 
western world.
Since the normalization of relations and the 
establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the United 
States in January of 1979, more and more American companies 
rush to knock on the door of this vast attractive market. 
Some succeed but many succumb to disappointment. One of the 
major reasons for such frustration is that most American 
companies don't understand the characteristics and the 
problems of the Chinese economy and market. Factors such as 
the Chinese government giving the highest priority for high- 
tech products over consumer or low-tech products, the 
inability of American companies to exchange Chinese currency 
for hard currency, and the lack of experience in negotiating 
with the Chinese, particularly in regard to the impacts of 
Chinese cultural characteristics in the negotiating process, 
have proven to be difficult hurdles for American companies to 
surmount. In addition, the primary goal of American 
companies in doing business with China is to generate profits 
from selling in the Chinese market whereas the primary goal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of the Chinese government is to generate foreign exchange by 
encouraging exports from China. All of these are studied in 
the following chapters.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter II 
China's New Economy & Its Foreign Trade
To crack the challenging but lucrative Chinese market, 
China's new economy and its foreign trade must be understood. 
In order to adequately understand China's "open-door” policy, 
its current economic performance, its foreign trade policy, 
and to identify its current economic problems one must 
consider China's foreign exchange shortage, poor 
infrastructure, arbitrary price system, low labor 
productivity, political risk, and the nature of foreign 
competition. A thorough understanding of these factors is 
essential to an American company considering establishing 
itself in China.
Open-Door Policy.
To achieve the goals of modernization, and overcome the 
problem of shortage of capital, technology, and modern 
management skills, the best and most efficient way for China 
to grow economically is to open its doors and attract foreign 
investment, especially from American and Japanese companies. 
With this purpose in mind, China's "open-door" policy has 
resulted not only in the promotion of commercial trade but 
was also embodied the elements of obtaining and utilizing 
foreign funds and consultant services, training workers in
5
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technical and administrative skills, and in addition, has led 
to the development of joint ventures, cooperative production, 
and compensation trade.^
Due to Mao's adoption of Stalin's model of a centrally 
planned economy, which emphasized the development of capital- 
intensive heavy industry over agriculture and light industry, 
many problems arose. These included sluggish agricultural 
output and low labor productivity, a weak hard currency 
position, sectoral disproportions, shortages in consumer 
goods, an inefficient system of planning and management, 
urban unemployment, and rigid, overcentralized bureaucratic 
structures and procedures. Mao's adherence to Stalin's model 
inevitably led to a deterioration of China's economic 
development.̂
After Mao's death, China's economic policy has changed 
dramatically. In 1978, China opened up a large section of 
its bamboo curtain and an "open to the outside world" policy 
was declared. Since 1978, in the Chinese Communist Party's 
Central Committee, the post-Mao leaders have presented a 
series of economic reforms and readjustment programs, and 
have announced their desire to catch up with the 
industrialized countries with the avowed goal of turning
2jia Shi, "Future Prospects for Broadening U.S.-China 
Economic and Trade Cooperation," Columbia Journal of World 
Business Twentieth Anniversary Issue (1966-1986).
3Jan S. Prybyla, "China's Economic Experiment from Mao 
to Market," Problem of Communism (Jan.-Feb. 1986).
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China into a major industrial nation by the year 2 000. This 
extremely ambitious plan was going to be implemented through 
stressing the four modernizations: agriculture, industry,
science and technology, and defense.
The essence of these new economic policies, according to 
Kent M. Wiedemann, a counsellor for economic affairs in the 
U.S. Embassy in Beijing, is aimed at introducing more market 
elements into the centrally planned economy and giving more 
autonomy to local governments and enterprises. This will 
result in the local governments and enterprises taking more 
responsibility for profits and losses, and taking a greater 
role in dealing with various economic activities such as 
recruiting, producing, pricing,and marketing more actively 
and efficiently. These new economic policies call for the 
application of market-determined pricing, differentiating 
wages, efficiency-oriented recruiting, and the encouragement 
of a free market, coupled with the attraction of foreign 
funds, technology, and management in order to promote greater 
productivity and efficiency. The goal then is to strengthen 
China's competitive position in the international markets in 
order to boost exports and earn necessary hard currency 
needed to pay for imports and finally to achieve the ultimate 
goal of modernization.̂
^Kent M. Wiedemann, "China in the Vanguard of a New 
Socialism," Asian Survey. Vol. XXVI No. 7 (July 1986):775- 
76.
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Current Economic Performance:
From the records of recent years, China's economic 
performance is far ahead of the long-range growth targets it 
set for itself. In the last five year plan (1981-1985), the 
actual annual growth in the gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output was 11 percent while the target annual 
growth rate was 4 percent. The data in table II-l reveal 
additional details about Chinese economic performance 
relative to the last five year economic plan.
Table II-l
Actual annual 
growth 
1981-1985 (%)
Target annual 
growth 
1981-1985 (%)
Gross value of indus­
trial and agriculture 
output
11 4
Gross value of indus­
trial output 12 4
Gross value of 
agriculture output 8 4
Gross national output 10 —
National Income — 4
Source: Xiuhua newsagency. (See Far Eastern Economic Review
April 10, 1986)
By vastly exceeding its planned economic growth rate, 
the living standards in China (i.e., the consumption of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
grain, edible-oil, pork, living space and the number of 
bicycles and TVs) have improved dramatically.®
Current Economic Problems.
There is no question, in the period of the last decade, 
China has became one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world. These achievements, according to premier Zhao Ziyang, 
are a result of reform, readjustment and open-door policies. 
However, this "open to the outside world" policy has 
revealed some economic problems which may seriously impede 
China's continued economic development and cool the invest­
ment enthusiasm of foreign companies. From the viewpoint of 
foreign companies which would like to enter the Chinese 
market, an ignorance of China's current economic problems 
might result in their investments proving unprofitable in the 
future.
1. Shortage of Foreign Exchange:
Due to the economic reform and the open-door policy, 
which gave greater control over economic decision making to 
local authorities and enterprises, and allowed them to retain 
a part of earned foreign exchange, the Beijing authorities' 
control over the expenditure of foreign exchange has been 
weakened. The large increase in imports in both industrial 
and consumer products by various local authorities and 
entities in recent years, has generated large deficits in
®Far Eastern Economic Review (March 20, 1986):78
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10
China's foreign trade, and has led to a rapid reduction in 
its foreign exchange reserves.®
(US $ Million)
1984 1985 1986
Trade deficits S 1.119 
Foreign Exchange Reserves: 16,800 $15,19911,900 $13,000*10,500*
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (June 1986) 
SSB year book.
*: Beijin Review figure.
Facing the continuing trade deficits and the decline in 
foreign exchange reserves, the central government has adopted 
more restrictive policies to control foreign exchange and 
import.̂  To reduce the trade deficit and the drain on 
foreign exchange reserves, China has recently adopted a 
two-year "ban" on "luxury" imports such as cars, color TVs, 
refrigerators and stereo cassette recorders, and has devalued 
its currency— Remminbi sharply against the U.S. dollar and 
Japanese yen to boost its exports.
Although China has undertaken stringent measures to 
reduce the loss of its foreign exchange reserves, according
®"China's Open to the World," Problems of Communism 
(Nov.-Dec. 1986).
^Nanfang Ribao (Guanghou) (June 9, 1985): 1; and Shijie 
Daobao (March 24, 1986):3. (See Problems of Communism
(Nov.-Dec. 1896):64)
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to Premier Zhao Ziyang, the shortage of foreign exchange will 
remain a major problem for a long time.®
2. Shortage of Raw Material, Energy, and Infrastructure.
Under the reform program, local governments and 
enterprises were given greater decision-making autonomy to 
initiate new investments and allocate the funds which they 
needed. In exercising this newly acquired right, although 
many positive results were created in many cases, a 
significant new headache which resulted from the local 
authorities' failure to adhere closely to the Central 
Government's guidelines was generated. The allocation of 
resources such as raw materials and electric power required 
by various newly constructed small and inefficient plants has 
unavoidably cut into the supply of resources needed to 
operate the existing more economical ones. This has resulted 
in many big and modern plants running below capacity. Due to 
the consideration of profitability and quicker returns, most 
local investments were concentrated on manufacturing and 
processing projects. Those projects, from a viewpoint of 
macroeconomics, became redundant and thus wasteful in 
resource allocation.®
®Zhao Ziyang's reports to the National People's Congress 
delegates in March 1986.
®Nai-Ruem Chen, "Readjustment Remains Goal of China's 
Economic Policy," Business America (May 31, 1982):19. Also 
see "China's Economy," The Economist (August 1, 1987):3-22.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Energy and transport bottlenecks are another serious 
problem in the process of recent economic development. In 
1985, due to the rapid growth in power demand and inefficient 
energy distribution, power shortfalls reached 50 billion 
Kilowatt hours (KWH). This shortage is nearly 10 percent 
below China's overall industrial growth. Although this 
situation has improved since early 1986, energy shortfalls 
will still plague the economy. In addition to the shortage 
of electric power, in 1986 raw coal output rose only 1.1 
percent and oil production grew only 2 percent. This 
production level still lags far behind the 1986 economic plan 
target. Row coal output was expected to rise 3.5 percent, and 
oil production to increase 4 percent.
China's transportation and communication network needs 
to be expanded and simultaneously overhauled. So far, China 
still relies heavily on its vastly overburdened railway 
transportation system. In spite of efforts to improve the 
railway system by double-tracking, electrification, and 
dispatching most of the major rail upgrading projects are not 
scheduled for completion until 1990.^^ This will undoubtedly 
impede the economic growth of China.
As one of the important factors of the investment 
environment, the basic hardware infrastructures of energy.
10"Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for 
the United States,” American Embassy Beijing (October 
1986):5-6.
llsusiness America (Nov. 26, 1984) p. 7.
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transportation and communication, might necessarily be the
first and most important considerations of foreign investors
thinking of stepping into China's market. Just like Deng
Xiaoping said, "For a number of years, the factors in our
economy have been in imbalance," he said
We don't have enough electric power, for example, 
if you want to build more factories, how are you 
going to operate them without power? If we don't improve our transportation, how can we e x p a n d ? ^2
3. Arbitrary Pricing-System & Low Labor Productivity.
Other serious problems which were exposed in the process
of implementing China's economic reforms were its arbitrary
pricing system and the low productivity behind its cheap
labor. Both of them could have the effect of impeding one of
the most important goals of China's open-door policy, the
attraction of foreign investments. Unlike free market
economies in which commodity prices are largely dependent
upon the law of supply and demand China's central planned
economy results in the arbitrary pricing of most commodities.
The shortcoming of this irrational pricing system has
resulted in China's economy being divorced from productivity
development and unrelated to international prices. Such a
pricing system has certainly made it difficult for both
foreign investors and Chinese enterprises to meet their cost
control, production and marketing schedules. Thus, it is
^^Daniel L. Board and Herbert S. Levine, "China's Long 
Road to Large-Scale Trade," Business Week (May 28, 1979).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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very difficult to set prices and forecast profits for their 
products or to make their long-term plans.
In fact, a new price reform was undertaken in the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). To reflect the produc­
tion costs and take into account the supply and demand forces 
in the economy, selective price increases have been allowed 
for commodities that are in short supply or whose production 
costs have risen sharply. Likewise, prices for certain 
materials and goods have been reduced to help producers 
reduce their inventories accordingly. In general, the scope 
of the state-controlled pricing structure has been reduced, 
and a more competitive pricing environment between buyers and 
sellers has resulted.
Obviously, price reform is very important and valuable in 
China's whole economic reform movement. However, so far, 
these more flexible pricing practices have been largely 
restricted to the overstocked and lesser important com­
modities. The government in many cases still plays a key 
role not only in the allocation of financial and human 
resources but also in intervening in the prices of essential 
industrial raw materials especially when the prices fluctuate 
too s h a r p l y . O b v i o u s l y ,  China has a long way to go to 
achieve a market economy through pricing reform since any
^^Luc De Wulf, "Economic Reform in China," Finance & 
Development. (March 1985): 10.
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such reform will necessarily have to be introduced cautiously 
and gradually.
The term "iron-rice bowl" is a traditional Chinese
concept which refers to the job security of a worker hired by
the government. Once hired the worker's job is secure and
not dependent upon job performance. As an iron rice bowl is
not subject to breakage neither is the Chinese government
worker subject to termination of his employment. This term
as used in China represents another socialistic policy which
has led to low labor productivity nationwide.
As the birthplace of Confucianism, strictly speaking,
China has gone even further than Japan in enmeshing family
life with the workplace. In China,
The family whose head works for a large-scale 
state-owned enterprise will most likely live in 
enterprise housing, attend movies in enterprise 
auditoriums, send the children to enterprise 
schools, utilize enterprise health facilities, and 
expect at least one of the children to replace his 
or her parent upon the letter's retirement.
Under this employment policy, an enterprise hires more
workers than are needed. Once hired, a person is never fired.
This is what the Chinese call the "iron-rice bowl,"
Undeniably, from a broad social viewpoint, the concept of the
"iron-rice bowl" is a humane approach which the Chinese
government has been proud of and considers to be superior to
the attitude towards labor under capitalism. However, just
Kenneth Lieberthal, "China: The Politics Behind the
New Economics," Fortune (December 31, 1979):49.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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like a double-edged sword, this policy fosters inefficiency 
since firms cannot fire ineffective workers or lay off excess 
laborers. This results in lowered labor productivity and 
weakens the China's advantage of cheap labor in terms of 
attracting foreign investments.
4. Political Risk:
Currently, there is an inherent internal political risk 
to China's open door policy. The power struggle between the 
reform group and its conservative opponents in the top levels 
of the Chinese Communist Party is still ongoing. Besides the 
difference between reform practice and rigid ideology, the 
conflicts between different interest groups in the party and 
government negatively effect the "open-door** policy.
Indisputably, during the past seven years, Deng Xiaoping 
and his leadership have made remarkable progress in economic 
growth and in improving the standard of living for the 
general populous through the open-door policy. Nevertheless, 
there have been some tradeoffs which in terms of political, 
economic, social and cultural adjustments which have had a 
negative impact on the country during the process of changing 
from a relative closed society to an open one. The
conservatives in the party have claimed that Deng has made a 
mistake in loosening the country's economic controls and
^®Huan Guocang, "China's Opening to the World," Problems 
of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1986):74.
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opening its door to corrupting foreign influences.^® They 
have also complained that more and more smuggling, 
corruption, black marketeering, and many illegal activities 
which they called "evil winds" have increased significantly 
following the rapid and extensive foreign involvements in 
China in recent years.
In addition to these criticisms, the conservatives have 
also argued that the "open-door" policy has driven socialist 
China to the "capitalist road" and has resulted in the 
selling out of the country's sovereignty. So far, the reform 
group has been unable to fully conquer its opponents in the 
debate over party ideology, and has not been able to create a 
new ideology of sufficient strength to justify and legitimize 
its reform program and the "open-door" policy.
Obviously, this political risk which results from the 
ideological conflict within the top level of the party might 
shake the confidence of foreign investors. As a result, they 
might hesitate while making long-term commitments in China. 
In fact, the foreign investment in the first two quarters of 
1986 had declined 30 percent and there has been no growth in 
foreign investment or foreign commercial loans in the first 
quarter of 1987.^® However, while more and more multi-
^®"China-on-a-Fence," The Economist (May 25, 1986): 16.
"China's Opening to the World," Problems of Communism 
(Nov.-Dec. 1986):74.
l®Chinese Daily News (June 23, 1987):1.
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national companies take into account the political 
environment of the host government as very important 
considerations in their foreign investment decisions, the 
continuity of the present policies and internal political 
stability will be one of the major determinants in the 
success or failure of China's economic reform and "open-door” 
policy. This is especially true while China remains so 
heavily dependent upon the development of foreign trade and 
capital investment.
5. Foreign Competition:
Besides those domestic economic problems which have been 
mentioned above, China also faces various external challenges 
in the areas of exports and foreign investments which could 
impede its economic development.
To offset the trade deficit and earn more foreign 
exchange to meet the need of domestic development, more 
emphasis on expanding its exports is very essential to 
China's economy. However, despite the increase in exports 
over the past seven years, China still faces stiff 
competition from its Pacific neighbors such as Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and other new developing countries in 
tapping the international market. Unlike Taiwan and Korea, 
China may be entering world markets too late to achieve the 
growth that its rivals experienced in the 1960s and 1970s.
19 "China's Push for Exports in Turning into a Long 
March," Business Week (September 15, 1986):66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
Due to the recession of the world economy global trade isn't 
growing as fast as in the two previous decades. Moreover, 
the advent of international protectionism among developed 
countries has made it more difficult for China to expands its 
e x p o r t s . S o  far oil and textiles accounts for more than 50 
percent of China's exports. Unfortunately for China oil 
prices are falling while textiles face quotas in most major 
markets. In order to reduce the damage brought on by China's 
reliance on such a limited export base it is essential that 
it diversify its exports base through the adoption of various 
incentive policies aimed at increasing its exports.
With regard to attracting foreign investments, China 
also faces fierce competition from other developing 
countries, especially A S E A N ^ i  and Latin American countries. 
Based on their free enterprise systems these two geographic 
areas offer a more advantageous business environment in terms 
of business negotiation, management, manufacturing, and 
marketing than China does. In addition to these factors, 
various tax and incentive programs and business services also 
have been adopted by these governments to encourage the 
business climate. All of these have undoubtedly, led to a 
weakening of China's ability to attract foreign investments.
^Ouuan Guocang, "China's Opening to the World," Problems 
of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1986):60.
Association of South-East Asia Nations includes: 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, and Philippine.
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Foreign Trade & Trade Policy:
Because of the policy of self-sufficiency in Mao's era, 
China's economy and the standard of living enjoyed by its 
people are still far behind the developed countries and even 
poorer than most developing countries. Likewise, its 
productivity and level of technology are relative low. Under 
this condition, in order to promote its economic development, 
foreign trade must be increased if China is going to acquire 
advanced technology, equipment, and materials for production 
and consumption.
Since the establishment of the "open-door" policy in 
1979, the value of China's trade with the rest of the world 
has grown rapidly. The following data indicate the level of 
China's exports, imports and balance of trade in recent 
years.
Table II-2
China's Exports, Imports and Balance of Trade 
(Million of Dollars)
Year Exoorts Imoorts EOT
1979 $13,614 $15,621 $-2,007
1980 18,099 19,941 -1,842
1981 21,456 21,635 -170
1982 21,872 18,900 +2,972
1983 22,177 21,336 +841
1984 24,831 25,950 -1,119
1985 27,327 42,526 -15,199
1986* 30,900 42,900 -12,000
Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics (June 1986).
*: Chinese custom statistics.
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Between 1979 and 1985, the value of China's exports more 
than doubled and the value of imports increased by 172 
percent. This represents a 13 percent average annual growth 
rate in exports and a 20 percent average annual growth rate 
in imports while the average annual growth rate of total 
trade in the period of 1950 to 1978 was 6 p e r c e n t . ^2
Besides a significant increases in total trade value, 
over the past thirty-five years the composition of the 
commodities comprising China's foreign trade have also 
undergone profound changes. The data in figure II-l, showed 
the commodity structure of China's exports and imports in 
1985.
As figure II-l shows, the export of foodstuffs accounted 
for only 15.2 percent of total exports in 1985 while it 
accounted for 90.2 percent of total value in 1950.^3 
Meanwhile, the exports of fuel and industrial products 
increased from 9.3 percent in 1950^^ to 72 percent 1985. 
This change in the ratio of foodstuffs to industrial exports 
reflects the magnitude of China's commitment to 
industrialization. As far as imports are concerned, the 
heavy industrial products represent the most important 
expenditure of foreign exchange, accounting for 62.2 percent 
of the value of China's imports.
22statistic Yearbook of China (1981): 357. 
23ibid. p. 358.
24ibid.
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Figure II-l 
China's Trade Structure
Heoi/y Industrial ( 9 5 X )
EXPORTS
Fud (27.1 R )
Industrial Materials (S .O R )
Textiles jc  Light Indudria l (35.1  R )
Chierniods (1 1 .2R )
IÎ-IPORTS
tiles  Light Ind. Praduct (1 4 jOR)
Heavy Industrial Products (S 2 .2 R
Indudria l M aterials ( 7 3 R )
F u d  Jc O th e r ( 0 3 R )
Source: China's Customs Statistics, Based on
China's trade I-II Quarter, 1985. (See Business 
Economics Oct. 1986, p. 33.)
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However, for a foreign company which is going to trade
with China, understanding the trends in China's trade is not
enough. Knowledge of China's foreign trade policy is more
important since it reveals the priorities established by
China in the area of foreign trade. Thus foreign firms
cognizant of these priorities should be able to more
effectively meet the demands of the Chinese market.
Briefly, China's foreign trade policy has three main
characteristics.
First, imports are controlled by the government so 
that essential consumer goods and capital goods 
from abroad can be acquired in the process of 
modernization. Second, to obtain the foreign 
exchange to pay for the necessary imports, the 
Chinese government tries to direct and encourage 
the expansion of exports. Third, to ensure that 
the foreign exchange obtained from exports is used 
to pay for essential imports, the government 
controls foreign exchange by setting the exchange 
rate and monopolizing and regulating the trade of 
fore ign exchange.  ̂5
During the past three years, China has steadily de­
centralized decision-making for export, while tightening 
control over imports. The government has encouraged local 
authorities, enterprises and even private individuals to 
conduct export business directly with foreign c o m p a n i e s . 26 
Through promoting exports, China can be expected to generate 
the foreign exchange earnings needed to satisfy the demand
25ceorge C. Chow, The Chinese Economv. (Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1985)Î289-90.
26Liawana (Mar. 10, 1986) p. 12-13.
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for the import of materials, equipment and technology
required to achieve the goal of modernization.
As to trade priority, according to China's Seventh Five-
Year Plan (1986-1990), priority in imports will be given to
advanced technologies, key equipment and computer software,
while exports will concentrate on textiles, processed foods,
petroleum, coal, non-ferrous metals, and farm products.
Foreign exchange earnings will be directed to key projects in
the areas of energy, transportation, communication, machine
building and electronics.
Strictly speaking, the "open-door" and "economic reform"
policies during the past several years have proven valuable
and successful.
It has brought a large measure of foreign capital, 
technology, equipment, and management skills to 
China, thereby speeding up China's transformation 
into a modern industrial society and narrowing the 
institutional disparity between the Chinese economy 
and the industrial market economies. It has, at 
the same time, strengthened China's position in the 
international market. In the long run, it will 
likely have a strong impact on the process of 
China's development and upon China's relationship 
with the outside w o r l d . 27
Today, China's economy is facing various challenges from 
both domestic and international spheres. Continuous economic 
adjustments must be undertaken by the Chinese government in 
order to effectively respond to this changing economic 
environment. In fact, Chinese leaders have repeatedly 
announced that they would make certain policy adjustments to
27Problems of Communism (Nov.-Dec. 1986):77.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
assure that the "open-door" and "economic reform" policies 
would be kept intact.28 In April 1986, the passing of the 
"Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprises 
Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital" revealed a greater 
concern by the Chinese government for enhancing the legal 
rights of foreign investors. This legislation specifically 
gives to fully foreign-owned enterprises the right to hire 
and fire employees,29 and demonstrates that China's efforts 
to maintain its "open-door" and "economic reform" policies 
are bona fide.
In the long run, it is believed that the future of 
China's economic reform is bright as long as China continues 
improving its business environment to attract foreign 
investors. This end can be accomplished through a further 
reduction in party and government intervention in the 
business activities of enterprises. With less intervention 
foreign investors and local enterprises should be able to 
maximize the initiative, creativity and flexibility required 
to respond to the changing economic environment.
28 Renmin Ribao, (April 10, 1986): 1 and (June 12, 
1986):1.
29 Liaowana (September 1, 1986):5.
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Chapter III 
Chinese-American Trade
By reviewing recent U.S. and China trading practices and 
identifying current obstacles facing American and Chinese 
trade in terms of negotiation, profit retention, legal 
environment, and business costs, it is believed that American 
companies can further understand the characteristics of the 
Chinese market, its potential priorities, its possible 
problems, and future trade prospects. Such a review would be 
helpful to them in making the decision to trade with China. 
Review of U.S.- China Trade.
The first trade between China and the United States was 
started in 1784. The first American vessel to enter the 
China trade was the Empress of China. It sold American furs, 
ginseng, and silver dollars in Canton in exchange for tea, 
silk, and p o r c e l a i n . F r o m  that time on, China has been an 
important American customer until the outbreak of the Korean 
War in 1950. In 1972, the United States canceled its embargo 
against China. Of greater importance than cancelling the 
embargo, however, was the establishment of diplomatic
John D. Daniels, Jeffery Knig, and Douglas Nigh, "U.S. 
Joint Ventures in China," California Management Review 
(Summer 1985).
26
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relations between the two countries in January 1979. This 
normalization of relations enabled these two governments to 
reach various important agreements necessary for normal 
economic commercial relations. As a result, the U.S.-China 
trade was rapidly and greatly facilitated. So far, the 
United States is the third largest trade partner of China 
while China is the largest communist market for America.
For most American companies, especially those which 
already have a substantial presence throughout most of the 
world, the Chinese market represents the greatest potential 
untapped market remaining for them. After all, it would be 
imprudent for them to ignore a market which makes up a 
quarter of the world's p o p u l a t i o n . T h e  management of Nike 
Corporation, the shoe manufacturer, sums up the feeling of 
many American firms when considering trade with such a vast, 
untapped market when it contemplates the potential sale of 
shoes to one billion pair of feet. Many other American firms 
have similar "China dreams."^^
Aside from the size of the Chinese market, from a 
viewpoint of global competitive strategy, American companies 
should not wait too long to attempt entry into the Chinese 
market particularly because Japanese firms have already
3^Business America (October 5, 1981):18.
32«u,s Joint Ventures in China," California Management 
Review (Summer 1985).
"Nike in China" case by Harvard Business School
(1985).
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preempted them to some degree in gaining a market leadership 
position in China. In addition, it would be worthwhile for 
American companies to tap China's cheap labor force in order 
to compete more effectively with Japanese firms in United 
States and other markets.
On the other hand, because of America's leadership role 
both on the international political and economic stage, by 
trading with the United States, China could effectively 
strengthen its position in the international economic 
community, and obtain management skill, advanced technology 
and equipment more easily.
As a result of the "normalization of relations" and the 
"open-door" policy, during the period 1979-1986, China-U.S. 
bilateral trade demonstrated extraordinary growth. This 
growth in trade grew from a level of $2.3 billion in 1979 to 
$8.3 billion in 1986. The data contained in table III-l shows 
the amount of imports and exports in U.S-China trade during 
this period.
34iiu.s Joint Ventures in China," California Management 
Review (Summer 1985).
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Table III-l
U.S Trade With China 
(Millions of Dollars)
year U.S. Exports U.S. Imoorts EOT
1979 $1,731 $ 594 $1,1371980 3,821 1,075 2,7461981 3,624 1,892 1,7321982 2,920 2,284 6361983 2,173 2,243 -701984 3,016 3,114 -981985 3,950 3,821 1291986 3,106 5,241 -2,135
Source: Survey of Current Business.
During this period (1979-1986), U.S. exports to China 
have fluctuated year to year but nevertheless are 
significantly greater than they were in 1979, growing from 
$1.7 billion in 1979 to $3.1 billion in 1986. On the other 
hand, China's exports to the U.S. have grown steadily with 
the exception of one year (1983) , growing from $594 million 
in 1979 to $5.2 billion in 1986. According to Chinese 
statistical data, in 1985 the United States supplied 12.2 
percent of all Chinese imports, second only to Japan. In 
that same year the United States purchased 8.3 percent of all 
Chinese exports, third after Japan and Hong-Kong. In 1986, 
bilateral trade between the United States and China earned 
China $2.13 billion in foreign exchange. In comparison, 
during the same year Japan experienced a huge trade surplus 
from its trade with China. As can be seen, the United States
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has been an very important trading partner of China from a 
balance of trade standpoint.
However, in terms of total U.S. trade, China is still a 
relatively small trading partner. U.S. exports to China in 
1985 were only 1.8 percent of the value of total U.S. 
exports. U.S. imports from China in 1985 accounted for 1.2 
percent of all U.S. imports. China was the 16th ranked U.S. 
trade partner in that year.
Besides the rapid growth in total trade value, the 
normalization of U.S.-China relations and China's aggressive 
foreign trade policy has made the commodity composition of 
bilateral trade change significantly. Data on the 
composition of U.S.-China trade during 1985 is shown in table 
III-2.
Table III-2
Commoditv Grouo
U.S.
Imoorts Percent
U.S.
Exoorts Percent
Food & live animals $157.17 4.1 $103.23 2.7
Beverage & tobacco 5.00 0.1 1.24
Crude materials 125.81 3.3 567.60 14.9
Mineral, fuel & lubricants 985.99 25.5 2.19 0.1
Oils & fats 1.00 --- 0.53 ---
Chemicals 162.86 4.2 513.12 13.5
Manufactured goods 656.36 17.0 359.80 9.5
Machinery & transport. 90.97 2.4 1,919.39 50.5
Misc. manufactures 1,633.50 42.3 313.43 8.3
Other 43.00 1.1 16.04 0.4
Total $3,861.67 100.0 $3,800.15 100.00
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Import, Export, FT
155.455 (1985).
35iiporeign Economic Trends and Their Implications for 
the United States," American Embassy Beijing in October 1986.
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Table III-2 indicates that U.S imports from China in 
1985 were concentrated in "mineral fuels & lubricants," 
"manufactured goods," and "miscellaneous manufactures," which 
together represented 84.8 percent of imports from China. 
U.S. exports to China in 1985 were concentrated in "crude 
materials" and "machinery & transport equipment," which 
together accounted for 65 percent of exports to China. 
Compared with the early years of the "open-door" policy where 
agricultural commodities were a dominant factor in U.S-China 
trade s t r u cture,this significant change in bilateral trade 
structure reveals China's substantial progress in the 
promotion of industrial output. It is believed that with the 
development of its economic structure, coupled with its low 
labor costs that China might replace the four small dragons 
of Asia: Korea, Taiwan, Hong-kong, and Singapore, in supply­
ing more and more low and middle level products to the 
American markets. On the other hand, America's exports of 
chemicals, specialized machinery, computers, energy 
generating equipment, transportation and communication 
equipment will continue to boost the Chinese need for further 
economic development.
Obstacles to Trading with China.
While the business environment has been improved 
especially in the area of hardware construction by the
^®In 1981, for example, agriculture represents 54.4 
percent of U.S. export to China and 35.6 percent of total 
value.
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Chinese government, and bilateral trade has reached a 
historic high of $8.3 billion, more and more American 
companies are beginning to complain that the Chinese 
government has not paid enough attention to improve its 
software in the business environments. Specifically, 
negotiation style, bureaucracy, foreign exchange rules and 
the legal environment are problems. Because Chinese 
government inattention to these factors American companies 
have experienced increased difficulties in doing business in 
China.
1. Negotiation & Bureaucracy.
As the first step in entering into and trade with China, 
negotiation may be the toughest hurdle for foreign companies 
to surmount. Negotiating in China is confusing because China 
often does not clearly identify its authorized negotiator. 
Furthermore, successful negotiations do not always receive 
a p p r o v a l . I n  recent years, many American companies have 
been frustrated with the length of time required for their 
Chinese counterparts to make decisions, and have been puzzled 
about with whom they are to make contact. "Indeed, it wasn't 
unusual to negotiate for months without ever knowing who the 
real Chinese buyer or seller w a s , s a i d  by one veteran 
foreign trader.
"Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for 
the United States," American Embassy Beijing (October 1986).
33The Wall Street Journal Wednesday, April 3, 1985.
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Bureaucracy is one of the major reasons why negotiations 
in China often prove to be inefficient. Since the "economic 
reform" from 1979, there has been a more open and realistic 
business atmosphere in China, but it doesn't mean doing 
business there is any easier, even for the Chinese them­
selves. With regard to the world's oldest bureaucracy, an 
officer of China's National Light industrial Products 
Corporation complained, "It takes us months sometimes years—  
to do what other countries can accomplish quickly, because We 
common people have little power against bureaucratic 
regulations."^® On the other hand, even though 
decision-making has been decentralized in recent years, many 
local authorities and units which might have the full 
authority to make a trade decision, are still confused about 
what approvals must be obtained before a deal is completed. 
As a result, this tends to make negotiations long and 
difficult.
2. Profit Retention.
A rising problem in U.S.-China trade in the two most 
recent years is the retention of profits in China. Funds 
shortage, for most developing countries, has always been a 
major problem in their economic development. China has faced 
the same problem. Its foreign exchange which is necessary for
3®Fortune (December 31, 1979):51.
^^Richard H. Holton, "Marketing and the Modernization of 
China," California Management Review (Summer 1985).
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foreign trade has been substantially decreasing in recent 
years. During the past two years, many American firms have 
complained about the difficulty of converting profits made in 
China into the hard currency.
In China, most consumers spend only nonconvertible 
domestic currency— Remminbi— for goods found in local stores. 
This Chinese currency cannot be traded in the international 
currency markets. Under this condition, for those American 
companies which sell successfully in China, the acquisition 
of more and more remminbi has been a big burden for them. 
George Liu, president of Asian Operations for General Foods 
exclaimed
We could be selling three to four times more
Maxwell House instant coffee in China, but the more
I sell, the bigger the hole I dig for myself . . .
I'm ending up with a lot of renminbi.
To solve this problem the Chinese government has 
encouraged American companies to reinvest their profits and 
expand their production in China and wait for China to earn 
enough foreign exchange to trade for local c u r r e n c y . in 
addition, some American companies also has been induced to go 
into unrelated export businesses such as Pepsi Cola's 
entering the Chinese marble export industry.  ̂̂ Through 
buying and selling Chinese goods, especially raw materials in
41"piaying the China Card," Forbes (April 7, 1986).
42«China's Open to the World," Problems of Communism 
( N o v . -Dec. 1986).
43«The Long March," Forbes (December 15, 1986).
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the international markets, American companies are allowed to 
hold the hard currency they have earned, thus enabling them 
to convert their excess renminbi.
Such encouragement, however, can only make the situation 
worse. American companies are left with the uncomfortable 
feeling of being forced to keep their profits in China as 
well as having to deal with the uncertainty of entering into 
unrelated industries. For a coffee or soft drink company, 
can you imagine asking it to sell Chinese coal in the 
international market? There are marketing problems, storing 
and shipping problems, pricing problems and quality problems, 
which they have never met before. The big question for such 
a company is can they sell the product successfully?
3. Legal Environment.
Until the new emphasis on law that began in 1979 with 
"open-door" policy, there were no fixed legal systems in 
China, especially during the period of the Cultural 
Revolution. During this period, law was subservient to party 
policy and in response to Chairman Mao's assessment of the 
"revolutionary situation." Even in 1980, according to a 
report, there were only twelve lawyers in Beijing. That 
equated less than one lawyer for every 200000 people.
To attract foreign investors, numerous laws such as the 
"joint venture law" and the "law of the PRC on enterprises
44Peter and Alexis Nahenkis, "China's Law on Joint 
Ventures," California Management Review (Summer 1980).
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Operated exclusively with foreign capital" have been enacted 
during the past seven years. However, they are still not 
explicit enough to make foreign companies feel secure in 
terms of what is to be expected.  ̂̂
American companies complain that the Chinese laws are 
"too vague and too general."^® They also complain that 
current Chinese legal institutions cannot provide them the 
guarantees and rights that accompany a comprehensive or 
complete legal process. Furthermore, they argue that the 
laws are not detailed enough to cover all issues and 
contingencies encountered in doing business.
In general, the absence of qualified lawyers, proper 
courts, predictable and guaranteed judicial procedures, 
coupled with the lack of intellectual property protection^® 
has shaped an uncertain legal environment for foreign 
companies. This lack probably result in the lowering of 
Americans' confidence and deters American companies from 
doing business with China.
^^Rudy L. Rnggles, Jr., "The Environment for American 
Business Ventures in the PRC," Columbia Journal of World 
Business (Winter 1983).
4^The Asian Wall Street Journal (March 17, 1986):4.
4^"China's Open to the World," Problems of Communism 
(Nov.-Dec. 1986): 68.
4®Business America (May 11, 1987):22.
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4. Business Costs.
Cheap labor doesn't necessarily guarantee low business 
costs. Due to a rapidly increasing inflation rate, 
relatively high wages which result from excess labor and low 
productivity, and incomplete market structures, the cost of 
doing business in China today has increased significantly. 
Moreover, the office rents in China are extremely expensive. 
In fact, they are almost twice as high as those charged in 
Hong-Kong's central business d i s t r i c t . A s  a result, many 
foreign companies have quietly begun retrenching. Notably, 
in recent months, both IBM and Westinghouse have either 
reduced staff or closed up offices outside Beijing. "We were 
spending too much on office leasing in Shanghai . . . .  You 
could go bankrupt if you don't retrench with the times" says 
Westinghouse China's L.C. S a u n d e r s . ^0 
Future Prospects of Oiina-U.S. Trade.
Specific areas of discontent in trading with China, 
including lengthy negotiations, complex bureaucratic 
procedures, uncertain and changing regulations, high business 
costs and unconvertible profits, all of which have been 
mentioned above, coupled with the shortage of foreign 
exchange and extremely low per-capita income ($350 in 1986), 
dim future prospects for American investment in and trade 
with China. Today the Chinese population, whether living in
^^Business America (June 23, 1986):7.
^®"The Long March," Forbes (December 15, 1986).
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urban or rural areas, no longer lives in starvation. The 
Chinese people live better, eat better and dress better. 
Nevertheless, in terms of consumer products market, it is 
unlikely, at least in the short terms, that China will be a 
significant market for most American companies. Obviously, 
since most Chinese earn an average of thirty U.S. dollars per 
month, it is very difficult to afford American-type consumer 
products such as compact cars, elaborate stereo equipment, or 
microwave ovens. On the other hand, it is also not very easy 
for China to penetrate the world's largest and most 
competitive consumer market— U.S.A— overnight. It will take 
a long time for China to develop products attractive to the 
American consumer and to develop competitive marketing 
skills.
However, there are also some bright spots for American 
companies. Because of America's technological leadership and 
given China's continued commitment to the development and 
technological modernization of its economy, potential exists 
for the growth of U.S. exports in the priority areas of 
energy, transportation, telecommunications, computer 
technology, chemical fertilizers, specialized machinery and 
lumber.®2 "Those are areas in which American industry is 
particularly competitive and where the Chinese have expressed
51«china's Law and Joint Ventures," California Manage­
ment Review (Summer 1980).
®^G.A. Thoma, "The Structure of Trade Between the 
U.S. and China," Business Economics (October 1986).
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a clear preference for U.S. equipment and technology" states 
Eugene K. Lawson, deputy assistant secretary for East Asia 
and the Pacific, U.S. Department of C o m m e r c e . F r o m  a 
viewpoint of long-term strategic consideration, it is 
probably a good strategy for American companies to remain in 
China and increase their efforts to strengthen relationships 
with various Chinese authorities and units, with the goal of 
reaping rewards from this market when the time is ripe.
53 Phil ip Maher, "Outlook Brightens for Trade with 
China," Business Marketing (July 1984):106.
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Chapter IV 
Chinese-American Trade Negotiation
As the first step in attempting to enter the Chinese 
market, negotiating has proven to be the most severe problem 
faced by most American companies in seeking to establish a 
trading relationship with China.
Since China announced its "open-door" policy in 1979, 
many American companies have rushed to knock on the door of 
this huge but unfamiliar market. Unlike Japanese and Hong­
kong companies, most American firms have unfortunately more 
often than not failed to reach real contractual commitments 
since they have little or no knowledge of Chinese negotiating 
practices, particularly of the role played by Chinese 
cultural factors in their negotiating process. In fact, this 
weakness in negotiating skill is not unique to American firms 
attempting trade in China. According to an estimate of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, for every successful American 
negotiation with the Japanese, there are twenty-five 
failures. One of the major reasons for this extremely high
40
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failure rate is most American companies' ignorance of the 
Japanese cultural background.
Unquestionably, successful agreements will prove the 
beneficial to both the interests of the Chinese and American 
companies. However, the impasses in negotiations which 
result from the differences in priorities and cultural 
backgrounds of both sides can also impede successful 
transactions.
Briefly, negotiation is the process in which two or more 
entities with different needs and viewpoints come together to 
reach an agreement of mutual benefit through a series of 
introduction, explanation, discussion and mutual 
compromises.^^ In fact, a successful commercial negotiation 
could be viewed as an art because it includes the interplay 
of various physical and psychological skills to reach a "win- 
win" situation in which both sides feel they are the winner 
in the process. This situation is not easily achieved. Many 
factors such as a negotiator's notion, attitude, behavior and 
methods he uses may change the outcome from a "win-win" to 
"win-lose” or even worse to a "lose-lose” situation in the 
negotiation.
S^Lennie Copeland and Lewis Griggs, Going International; 
How To Make Friends and Deal Effectively in the Global 
Marketplace (1985):72.
55philip R. Harris and Robert T. Moran, Managing 
Cultural Differences (Gulf Publishing Co., 1979):55.
56ibid. p. 59.
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Cultural Influences on Negotiation.
No doubt, negotiation is profound. However, negotiating
cross-culturally is more complicated.
A negotiation becomes cross-cultural when the 
parties involved belong to different cultures and 
therefor do not share the same ways of thinking, 
feeling, and behaving. All international 
negotiations are cross-cultural.®^
There are many differences in negotiation style from culture
to culture. There is no uniform negotiating style that can
be used effectively in every cultures. Negotiating style
varies with the various cultural conditions which one
encounters. Culture, according the anthropologist, is "that
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law,
morals, customs, and any capabilities and habits acquired by
a man as a member of society." Culture also is
the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another , . . the interactive aggregate of common
characteristics that influences a human group's 
response to its environment
in some managers' eyes.®® As a product of their own culture, 
peoples' thoughts, attitudes, behavior, and value concepts 
are varied. It is difficult at best to isolate cultural 
factors as a separate category when involved in commercial 
negotiations since they influence all actions of the counter­
parts in the process. As an example the negotiating style of
®^Nancy J. Adler, International Dimensions of Organiza­
tional Behavior (Wadsworth, Inc., 1986):151.
®®Ibid. p. 8-9.
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an Arab is necessarily different from that of a Japanese. 
Likewise, the negotiating style used in capitalistic 
countries also cannot be fully applied in communistic 
countries.
Since cultural differences between two entities can lead 
to misunderstanding and lack of trust, cross-cultural 
understanding has become very essential for success in 
conducting international negotiations. By identifying the 
specific cultural differences which might affect the 
negotiation process and contrasting the cultural biases of 
both sides, a negotiator may be able to make proper 
adjustments of attitude, behavior and tactics. If adopted at 
the right time a negotiator may be able to eliminate the 
contingent misunderstandings inherent in the cross-cultural 
negotiation process.
In recent years, American companies which have 
negotiated with the Chinese have begun to understand the 
differences between the negotiating style in China and that 
in other countries. Unquestionably, the negotiation process 
between American companies and Chinese enterprises is 
complicated. This results not only from the difference 
between the political and economic systems of these two 
countries, but also is a result of the impact of cultural 
differences between them. According to Dr. Lucian W. Pye, a 
specialist on Asian affairs and also an expert in negotiating 
with the Japanese and Chinese,
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the largest and possibly the most intractable 
category of problems in S ino-American business 
negotiations can be traced to the cultural 
differences between the two societies. Inevitably, 
frustrations and misunderstandings arise in the 
meeting of representatives from two such different cultures as China and America.
Basically, unlike the American culture which is thought of as
highly individualistic, efficiency and legally-oriented, the
Chinese culture tends to emphasize broad base harmonious
personal relations. The outgrowth of this cultural
characteristic in the negotiating process is the Chinese
negotiator's emphasis on group loyalty, sincerity,
trustworthiness, friendship and mutual benefit. The emphasis
placed on all of these cultural factors by Chinese negotiator
can lead to a lengthy and inefficient negotiating process.
This in turn results in a direct conflict with American
cultural values which are reflected in the American
negotiating style. As a result, misunderstandings,
frustrations and complaints arise.
Special Cultural Differences & Suggestions For Dealing With 
Them
1. Collectivism.
The Chinese, like most people in communist countries, 
are generally seen as collectivist, while Americans are 
thought of as stressing individuality over conformity. 
Individualism is a philosophy wherein people think of 
themselves and their immediate families as individuals and of
^^Lucian W. Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style 
(Rand Co., 1982).
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paramount importance. Individualism tends to thrive in
cultural environments where social frameworks are loosely
k n i t t e d . P e o p l e  in such a society rely on less social or
group considerations in their decision-making, and have more
authority and greater latitude in pursuing their individual
values. On the other hand.
Collectivism is characterized by a tight social 
framework in which people distinguish between their 
own groups such as relatives, clans, and 
organizations and other groups. People expect their 
groups to look after their members, protect them 
and give them security in exchange for members' 
loyalty.
For example, in a collectivist culture, people easily obtain 
jobs because they come from the right family or social class 
while in a individualistic culture people obtain jobs because 
they have the right education and work e x p e r i e n c e s . ® 2
Based on the difference between collectivist and 
individualistic cultures which are typically reflected in the 
negotiation process, the Chinese negotiating style inevitably 
tends to be more lengthy, secretive and tougher than the 
American negotiating style. Chinese negotiators, in contrast 
to American negotiators, have less authority and must consult 
with their superiors more frequently. Some of their decision­
making must also be guided by national priorities and
®®Nancy J. Adler, International Dimensions of Organiza­
tional Behavior, p. 36.
Gllbid.
®2ibid.
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interests. On the other hand, American negotiating style 
places greater stress more on efficiency and is expertise- 
oriented. Decisions for American negotiating teams are often 
made by the person who has the most experiences and authority 
in a given area. American negotiating teams see group 
decisions and bureaucratic approvals with which their Chinese 
counterparts must adhere as inefficient and unnecessary 
impediments to reaching agreement.
Obviously, with the influence of collectivist and 
individualistic cultures, the authority of decision-making 
can be varied. "For American negotiators, anything is 
O.K. unless it has been restricted."®^ However, for Chinese 
negotiators, the rule of thumb seems to be "nothing is 
permitted unless it is initiated by the state."
In dealing with this philosophy of collectivism of the 
Chinese negotiator, patience is the best policy for American 
companies if they truly desire to enter into successful 
agreements. Although American companies may be frustrated 
with the length of time required for their Chinese counter­
parts to reach group decisions and concomitantly may be 
confused as to who has the decision-making authority on the
Edward Beliaev, Thomas Mullen, and Betty Jane Punnett, 
"Understanding the Cultural Environment: U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade
Negotiations," California Management Review. Vol. XXVII No.2 
(Winter 1985); and Philip R. Harris and Robert T. Moran 
Managing Cultural Differences (Gulf Publishing Co., 
1979);672.
®4philip R. Harris, and Robert T. Moran, Managing 
Cultural Differences, p. 76.
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opposite side, it is not very useful to complain that the 
Chinese are tough, bureaucratic, or inefficient. American 
companies should realize that the decision-making style of 
Chinese negotiators are frequently influenced by the state or 
state ideology. Any delay on the Chinese side might not be 
the result of personal negligence or willful sabotage but 
result solely from constraints inherent within the system.
On the other hand, impatience on the part of its negotiators 
can lead American companies to a misunderstanding of a 
Chinese negotiator's real intent thus queering a potential 
deal.
2. Time.
Sense of time may be varied in different cultures. Some 
cultures pay much attention to time while some do not pay 
heed to time at all. This difference in time concept can also 
influence the negotiating pace. Interestingly, American say 
a clock "runs," but for the Chinese, a clock doesn't run, 
they say a clock "walks." Most American managers who have 
had dealings with the Chinese would agree that somehow a 
clock runs slower in China.
Generally speaking, Americans are seen as time­
conscious. They treat time as a valuable, tangible and
®%.T. Wang, China's Modernization and Transnational 
Corporations (B.C. Heath and Co., 1984):127.
^^John Frankenstein, "Trends in Chinese Business Prac­
tice: Changes in the Beijing Wind," California Management
Review (Fall 1986) .
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limited asset®^. Americans always think "time is money." 
Therefore, they arrange time, budget time and set deadlines 
for various activities. Most Americans attempt to do their 
best to meet these deadlines. In contrast, time does not 
seem so important to the Chinese. In fact, Chinese lack the 
concept that time is money. Furthermore, they take pride in 
being patient. Even in the Confucian Annalects. it is stated 
that "the faster you speed, the less you achieve." In 
Chinese daily life, the people use many vague terms such as 
"the time for finishing a cup of tea," and "already a while" 
to describe a length of time. Americans typically use more 
clear and concise words such as "a couple of minutes," or 
"ten minutes ago" to describe a length of time. In Taiwan 
there is a joke, "if you arrive at a banquet or party at the 
time designated on an invitation, you are not a real 
Chinese." All of these customs relating to time reveal that 
the Chinese attitude to word the value of time is much more 
lax than that of Americans.
The difference of time concept between Chinese and 
American negotiators make the American side look particularly 
impatient in the process of negotiating. American 
negotiators often expect the negotiation process to be 
completed as quickly as possible. They think that the 
Chinese take an inordinate amount of time before consummating
^^Lennie Copeland and Levis Griggs, Going International 
(1985):8.
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a deal. To the American this is wasteful. However, for the 
patient Chinese negotiator, any quick decision-making 
represents carelessness. If decisions are reached quickly 
the Chinese feel they may forget something or may fail to 
gain more favors from their American counterparts. Chinese 
negotiators seldom set an exact schedule or deadline for 
themselves in the negotiating process. Time is very flexible 
for them as long as they can take advantage of it. This is 
also a major reason why American companies should take much 
more time in negotiating with the Chinese. According to a 
survey of U.S. firms which conducted business in Beijing in 
1984, 66 percent of the American managers agreed that the
U.S. did not have any control over the time and pace of 
business negotiation. Furthermore, 60 percent felt that the 
Chinese did not keep well informed about schedules.®®
To cope with the Chinese slow pace and the home court 
advantage held by the Chinese, American companies should 
allot sufficient time for the negotiation process to be 
conducted pursuant to Chinese custom. American negotiators, 
instead of setting a strict deadline for themselves, should 
attempt to maintain a flexible time plan to cope with any 
contingent delays in the negotiation process. For most 
American businessman who are used to driving a car in the 
United States, it may be necessary to park the car and ride a
®®John Frankenstein, "Trends in Chinese Business 
Practice," California Management Review (Fall 1986).
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bicycle in China. If an American businessman's pace is not 
slowed down he will find that he is distancing himself from 
his Chinese counterparts,
3. Communication.
All negotiation activity involves communication. In the 
negotiating process, both sides exchange meanings through 
words, language, and body signs. Cross-cultural 
communication occurs when people from two distinct cultures 
attempt to communicate. The greater the difference between 
these two cultures, the greater the chance for cross-cultural 
miscommunication.
Due to its complex character structures and its extreme 
variety in nuances of meaning, the Chinese character and 
language are generally seen as a mystery to Americans. in 
many cases, it has been discovered that translation from 
Chinese to English and vice versa are extremely difficult. 
This difficulty has led to misunderstandings and 
misconceptions between Chinese and American negotiators. For 
example, in the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972,
which was issued jointly by the United States and China, the 
key word "acknowledge** used therein resulted in a disparate 
meaning for both sides. The English version stated that "the 
United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of 
the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that
®®Nancy J. Adler, International Dimensions of 
organizational Behavior, p. 51-53.
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Taiwan is a part of China." According to the interpretation 
given to this word by the United States it was intended to 
merely take note of the Chinese position without necessarily 
agreeing to that position. However, in the Chinese version, 
the word "acknowledge" not only means American understanding 
of the Chinese position but also implies that the United 
States agreed with this position.^®
Body language represents another communication style. 
The signals it conveys are also varied under different 
cultures, and frequently lead to misunderstanding. In the 
process of negotiating, to give face to American negotiators, 
the Chinese may nod frequently and say "yes, yes" while 
Americans talk to them. This probably means "yes, I have 
heard you" but not necessarily "yes, I agree with you" or 
"yes, I understand you." On the other hand, the Chinese "No" 
does not necessarily mean the same as an American "No." For 
example, to answer a question such as "Don't you agree?" or 
"Don't you understand?", in Chinese, in a person does not 
understand he will say "yes" while in English the answer 
would be " N o . I n  general, there is a tendency for Chinese 
to be indirect and vague when conveying their meanings in 
face to face negotiations while Americans prefer a direct and 
clear communication style.
70n .T. Wang, China's Modernization and Transnational 
Corporations (D.C. Heath and Co., 1984):114-73.
71ibid. p. 114-15.
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To eliminate the possibility of miscommunication in 
negotiating with the Chinese, it is suggested that an 
overseas C h i n e s e . ^2 who is familiar with the English language 
and American business practices be included on American 
negotiating teams. While an American may study the Chinese 
language and attempt to understand more about Chinese culture 
in an attempt facilitate communication with the Chinese, it 
is doubtful whether an American could ever communicate better 
than could a Chinese person. According to Lin Yiu Chu— a 
consultant of Chinese government in international business, 
an overseas Chinese has an edge over American businessmen for 
the following reasons. First, communication is easier and 
misinterpretation can likely be eliminated because both 
parties speak Chinese. Second, misunderstandings and 
misperceptions are not so likely to occur when communicating 
since both parties share a common cultural heritage. In 
negotiating, an overseas Chinese can easily understand some 
particular silent Chinese languages and certain shades of 
meanings. American negotiators on the other hand can not 
fully understand or glean such meanings from a "guide book." 
Too, the Chinese side has a tendency to privately seek out 
any ethnic Chinese associated with an American team who they 
believe is likely to want to see China prosper and who would
^^The Chinese who live in the overseas countries, such 
as the Chinese in Hong-Kong, Singapore, or the united States.
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possibly be sympathetic to C h i n a . U n d e r  this condition, 
having an overseas Chinese on an American team would probably 
provide a short-cut in coping with the communication gaps in 
negotiating with the Chinese.
4. Legal Concepts.
Chinese, traditionally, are averse to litigation. "It 
is better to be vexed to death than to get involved in a 
lawsuit," said Confucius. Instead of viewing the legal 
system and litigation as a protection of ones interest and a 
resolution of disputes, lawsuits are seen as shameful, 
face-losing, and dishonorable to the Chinese. American 
companies seeking to do business in China have found that 
they lack sufficient legal protection in their business 
dealings with the Chinese. When contracting with the 
Chinese, instead of using strictly legal words to regulate 
the duties and obligations of both sides, the Chinese prefer 
more harmonious and gentle phrases such as "negotiate and 
consultation" and "amicably settled through negotiation."^^ 
When disputes occur, the Chinese believe that their 
resolution should be sought through the negotiation process 
in order to achieve conciliation. They do not desire nor do 
they seek to resolve their disputes in the legal forum. The 
decision as to who is right or wrong is not left in the hands
^^Lucian Pye, "Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style" 
(1982); see summary xi.
Peter and Alexis Nehemkis, "China's Law on Joint 
Venture," California Management Review (Summer 1980):37-41.
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O f  the courts. Although more and more institutionalized 
legal systems have been developed in China, the cultural 
practice of stressing harmony and conciliation still 
reflects the Chinese anathems for l i t i g a t i o n .
In business negotiations, Americans prefer to base the 
rights and obligations of the parties on written contracts. 
This preference is predicated on the fact that they believe 
in and trust the legal system to enforce their written 
agreements assuming of course that the contract sought to be 
enforced has been signed by all parties involved. According 
to Richard N.Cooper— an officer of Commercial Department of 
the United States, "Americans want to write everything down; 
we are a very legal-minded s o c i e t y . I n  fact, Americans 
make more of an effort to procure executed contracts than 
they do to develop meaningful relationships with their 
counterparts. On the other hand, the Chinese do not see a 
signed contract as the most important achievement at the end 
of the negotiation process. The Chinese like to establish 
long term relationships with their counterparts since they 
see the stability of a contract not so much in terms of the 
power of strict regulations nor in the enforceability of its 
terms but in the strength of the human relationships between 
both sides. In the Chinese concept, commitments between 
people, not commitments to contracts are of paramount
75ibid.
^^Business Week (May 28, 1979);133.
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importance. The major element involved in the honoring of 
contracts is their trust of and respect for the people with 
whom they are doing business.
Since China does not have a strong legal system to 
govern the enforceability of contracts, American negotiators, 
instead of being rude by insisting on their own contract 
terms, should be flexible and attempt to adapt to Chinese 
norms and practices. An American negotiator's ultimate goal 
should be the establishment of long-term relationships. When 
negotiating with the Chinese, business should not be the only 
topic discussed, Americans should discuss other topics such 
as Chinese art, history, culture, scenery, and especially the 
progress of current Chinese economic development. Americans 
should also view luncheons, dinners, receptions, ceremonies 
and tour invitations during breaks in the negotiation process 
as a time for the building interpersonal relationships.^^ 
Since the Chinese place great emphasis on trust and mutual 
connections, it would behoove American companies to negotiate 
not just for a one time deal. The potential of establishing 
long-range relationships would be much more important and 
valuable than merely inking one contract.
5. Face-Saving.
While the concept of "face-saving" is important in most 
cultures, the Chinese culture is much more sensitive to it.
^^Nancy J. Adler, International Dimensions of 
Organizational Behavior, p. 168.
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To the Chinese, “face" not only means pride, dignity and 
respect, it can be more important than life. In a Chinese 
proverb, there is a saying, "A man can be killed, but cannot 
be shamed." Shame has traditionally been used by the Chinese 
as a way of making someone "lose face." The Chinese can 
probably can afford anything, but they just cannot afford 
"losing face."
The concept of "face-saving" varies significantly 
between different cultures. A little mistake or a feeling of 
inadequacy on the part of an American, might be deeply felt, 
be shameful or be humiliating to a C h i n e s e . F o r  example, 
when American companies send a low or middle level management 
personnel to take part in a negotiations with the Chinese, 
Chinese negotiators might feel angry and "lose face" even 
though the American negotiators have been given full 
authority by their company to make a decision. This negative 
feeling may be particularly reenforced when there has been a 
higher executive involved in negotiations on the Chinese 
side. Too, reasonable claims which are viewed as normal 
business practices by American firms, such as returning a 
defective product, may also be taken as a hurt of pride and 
dignity by the Chinese, thus making the Chinese side feel 
that American companies do not give them face.
^®L e n n i e  Co p e l a n d  and Lewis Griggs, Going 
Tnternational, p. 11.
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In addition, the Chinese notion of "saving-face" can 
also influence the Chinese response in the negotiating 
process. To save their face while they are seeking 
concessions from their counterparts, and to give the opposite 
side face while they are intending to reject a deal, the 
Chinese tend to respond indirectly and vaguely. This 
response from the Chinese most definitely can give rise to 
confusion and misperception among the American negotiators 
when negotiating with the Chinese.
With more understanding of Chinese sensitivity to the 
problem of "face-saving" in the negotiating process, it is 
believed that American companies could more easily build a 
better relationship with their Chinese counterparts in the 
negotiating process. By helping the Chinese negotiators to 
win face, American negotiators could effectively put them­
selves in a better position. On the other hand, a potential 
deal can be lost if the Chinese negotiators feel that they 
have been affronted or slighted during the negotiating 
process. This result may occur even though the American side 
had the best of i n t e n t i o n s . N e g o t i a t o r s  for American 
companies should be very careful in their attitudes and words 
in order to avoid making Chinese negotiators feel 
uncomfortable, defensive, and worse yet lose face. In fact, 
a successful negotiator, according to many experienced
^^Lucian W. Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style 
(1982):89.
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international negotiators, is the one who treats the person 
on the other side with respect and fair play.®®
6. Friendship.
Friendship is a very important factor in the 
establishment of business relationships around the world. 
This is especially so in China, as friendship implies a very 
special meaning for the Chinese. In fact, friendship to the 
Chinese can sometimes be more important than the relationship 
between a husband and wife or between parent and child. The 
Chinese attitude of placing greater emphasis on friendships 
can be proved by many Chinese history and proverbs. Such as 
"never reject or regret going through fire and boiling water 
to save a friend" and "for friendship, it is worth it to have 
knives inserted in both sides of your rib cage." Also, "A 
friend coming from afar is one of life's most happy events" 
and "let friends share your carriage and furry coats for 
free, and never regret sharing them even if they are wore out 
when returned" are sayings attributed to Confucius and Yen 
Hui, one of the most respected disciples of Confucius. These 
too, reflect the traditional Chinese attitude toward 
friendship.
Since China opened its doors in 1979, many American 
executives in China have perceived that the Chinese are very 
serious about the spirit of "friendship first, business 
second" when doing business with foreign companies. For
®®Goina International. p. 91
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foreign companies, "friend of China" implies sincerity, 
trust, patience, understanding, and sometimes certain 
sacrifices. This is always the first step in establishing 
long-term business relationship with the Chinese.
Since the difference in the way of viewing friendship 
between Americans and the Chinese in terms of attitude, 
value, and expectation is so dichotomous an understanding of 
this difference can have a great impact on the business 
negotiations between Americans and the Chinese. American 
executive in China would probably agree that it is easy to 
make friends with the Chinese and to call them old friends 
rather than new friends after even a short acquaintance.®^ 
The Chinese are very sensitive about how foreign companies 
treat them. They desire to be treated as equals and with 
respect like they treat their own friends. Under this 
condition, the best policy for American businessman to adopt 
when conducting business in China would be to attempt to 
become the kind of friend the Chinese admire. This would 
include being and doing what a Chinese person would do for a 
friend. On the other hand, in the negotiation process, 
Chinese expectations of what friends should be willing to do 
for each other frequently lead Chinese negotiator to make 
exaggerated demands on their counterparts. If the Chinese 
negotiator is not satisfied with the way in which he is being
®^Steven R. Hendryx, "The China Trade: Making the Deal
Work," Harvard Business Review (July-August 1986).
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treated or even feels that he is being mistreated his 
reaction will be one of anger and h o s t i l i t y . This result 
benefits neither side of the bargaining table.
Nevertheless, winning of "Waigou Penycu" (foreign 
friend) in negotiations with Chinese is to be highly 
recommended. American firms should understand and accept the 
Chinese offer of friendship in the spirit in which it is 
extended.G3 Through patience, sincerity, trust and respect 
for the Chinese side, and the granting of more munificent 
terms in relation to price, service, or parts, American 
negotiators could effectively build a friendly relationship 
with their Chinese counterparts. Efforts made by American 
negotiators to this end might result in American companies 
obtaining an exclusive niche in the Chinese business 
community as a reward from the Chinese side. Such a niche, 
in many cases, has proven to be worth more than the time and 
money taken to obtain it. However, as stated by an executive 
of First Chicago Bank in China, "the Chinese recognize, and 
are very serious about one thing: If you are their friend 
they will not forget you.
S^Lucian W. Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiation Style 
(1982):20.
G^Harvard Business Review (July-August 1986):80.
^^Management Review (May 1983):18.
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Conclusion
Regardless of market size, cost-saving or global 
competitive strategies, to American companies, trading with 
China is attractive, and in fact, unavoidable and will prove 
to be lucrative in the long run. Thus, understanding China, 
which includes understanding its economic condition, trade 
policies, business operating environment and cultural traits 
which profoundly affect business negotiation is absolutely a 
key requirement for American companies seeking entry into and 
trading with China.
China is not a "big sleepy dragon" any more. This big 
dragon has awakened and is taking big, ambitious strides 
toward the twenty-first century. Due to the failure of the 
Stalinist type centrally planned economy, and the painful 
experiences stemming from the "Cultural Revolution," China 
decided to adopt "open-door" and "economic reform" policies 
in 1978. Through giving more autonomy to enterprises and 
introducing market elements, foreign funds, technologies,and 
modern business management, China expects to invigorate its 
depressed economy and achieved the goal of four 
modernization.
61
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Since 1979, there has been tremendous progress in 
China's economy. Over the past eight years, the real average 
growth rate in foreign trade has been twelve percent while 
the annual growth rate in GNP has been six p e r c e n t . T h e  
living standard in China has approved significantly. 
However, irrespective of those praise worthy achievements, 
China has faced some problems including the lack of hard 
currency, low productivity, insufficient energy and 
infrastructure, arbitrary pricing system, ideological 
resistance from conservative group, and foreign competition. 
All of these may substantially impede the further development 
of China's economy, and reduce the confidence of these 
American companies considering entry into China. Unless the 
"open-door" and "economic reform" policies are further 
promoted and the business operation environment is 
continuously approved, China may not achieve the performance 
which it has experienced heretofore. However, these policies 
seen to have been guaranteed by the China government. 
According to Premier Zhao Ziyang, "In terms of opening China 
to the outside world, our guiding principle is not "closing" 
but "opening," is not "staying still" but "moving forward." 
The already opened door of China can only be opened wider and 
will never be closed again."®®
® 5J o s e p h  B a t t a t ,"China in 2010: Strategic
Considerations," Business Horizons (July-August 1987):5.
®®Zhao Ziyang, "The Opening of China," Atlantic MonthIv 
(December 1984): 24-25.
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Based on the "open-door" policy and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, the U.S-China trade has grown rapidly. 
Although China may not provide a market for most American 
type consumer products in the short-term, with Americans' 
leadership in technology and market share there exists a 
broad range of opportunities for American companies in the 
area of computer technology, energy generation,
transportation and communication, and chemicals. Although
entry into the Chinese market may prove to be profitable, it
must be recognized that there exist some obstacles which have 
shaken the confidence of American companies in this market.
There are, notably, lengthy negotiations, unconvertible
profits, an immature legal environment, and high business
operating costs.
To enter into and trade with the host country,
cross-cultural negotiation may proved to be the most
important and the most difficult hurdle to surmount for a 
foreign company. After all, any ambitions or plans of 
corporate management may become illusory if negotiator fail 
to win an agreement at the bargaining table. In the process 
of negotiating, cultural differences between both negotiating 
teams can have a deep impact on the outcome of negotiating. 
Since various people adopt different attitudes and behaviors 
to survive under their particular circumstance, cultures vary 
with the environment. There is no "good" or "bad," and 
"weak" or "strong" cultures. Each cultures has its own
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logic, so it is necessary to understand that any melding of 
two cultures is not achieved through conflict but through 
compromise.
When negotiating with the Chinese, American negotiators 
should put themselves the shoes of their Chinese counter­
parts. By adopting this approach of imagining what the 
Chinese mind is thinking in American negotiators can learn to 
cope with and succeed in bridging the cultural gaps which 
most assuredly influences the negotiation process. 
Basically, the Chinese culture is human relationship- 
oriented. The Chinese place a greater emphasis on harmonious 
group consensus and long-term relationships. With this in 
mind, six elements— collectivisation, the Chinese concept of 
time, legal environment, friendship, and face-saving, all of 
which influence Chinese negotiating style, are delineated 
analyzed and compared with these inhering in American 
culture. These cultural traits, reflected in negotiating 
process, frequently result in lengthy, inefficient 
negotiations, the ignoring of the legality of a contract, 
vague and indirect communication style, and exaggerated 
demands on a friendship.
To cope with these cultural gaps, it is suggested that 
American companies should show greater respect for the 
Chinese decision-making process, be patient with the Chinese 
pace, accept and understand the Chinese philosophy of 
friendship, give face to the Chinese negotiators, and
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establish a lasting business relationship with honesty, 
sincerity, and equanimity. In addition, having an overseas 
Chinese on American negotiating team to help facilitate 
communication in the negotiating process should strongly be 
encouraged.
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